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Gods Above: Naturalizing religion in term of our shared ape social dominance behavior
John S. Wilkins​[1]​
Abstract
To naturalize religion we must identify what religion is, and what aspects of it we are trying to explain. In this paper religious social institutional behavior is the explanatory target, and an explanatory hypothesis based on shared primate social dominance psychology is given. The argument is that various religious features, including the high status afforded the religious, and the high status afforded to deities, is an expression of this social dominance psychology in a context for which it did not evolve: high density populations made possible by agriculture.
1. Introduction
Suppose that one knew nothing else about the human species than that it was squarely nested within the African Great Ape clade, called Hominoidea . What would we know about that species? The inferential return on that phylogenetic investment is extensive and indefinite. We would know the species had a particular skeletal structure, with, among other things, four limbs ending in five-digit manus, or hands, and that it had a certain visual system, aural system, and so forth, and interacted with the world at a certain macroscale, in what von Uexküll called its Umwelt (1957), or sensed environment. It would have the primate Umwelt, and so interact with commonsense objects (Griffiths and Wilkins In Press). For our purposes here, however, what we would mostly know is that it was a social species with social dominance hierarchies.
Now it is very hard to find animal species that are not in some sense social. At the least they must interact during mating. But sociality comes in degrees ranging from a brief or even displaced social interaction at mating through to care of neonates and, as in chimp, gorilla, and even orang social behaviors, lifelong interaction with conspecifics of all ages. The one thing that marks all primate species, and thus all hominoids, is that they form dominance hierarchies based upon pairwise interactions, with sanctions of both a positive (reward collaborators) and negative (punish defectors) nature. As has been observed in many primate species (chimps, bonobos, various baboons and monkey species), alliances are formed and social deviants are punished (Cronin and Field 2007; de Waal 1982, 1989). We are socially normative apes. Moral strictures and social conformity is what apes do. Achieving high social dominance results in improved health and better mating opportunities (Burnham 2007; Creel 2001). Hence, such behaviors must be expected to play a crucial role in any social institution that may evolve generally in human, which is to say, one particular ape species’, social structures.
In itself social dominance is insufficient to explain much of religious behavior sui generis. The evolutionarily social behaviors of humans-as-apes merely explains that we are social, not how or why we are social. We project to the as-yet unknown species the general homologies of the clade; we cannot derive the special traits, called autapomorphies in phylogenetic systematics (unique, derived traits) are. In older terminology, we know the [logical] genus’, but not the species’, characters (as “general” is the adjective of genus, and “special” is the adjective of species). Moreover, we do not have an explanation of human social traits that would uniquely explain religious behaviors. Why, then, approach the issue this way?
In the history of social biology, which includes the nineteenth century attempts by Spencer and others, criticized by Huxley (1893) and Moore (1903), to biologize ethics (Kitcher 1993), the advocates of biological explanations of behavior have uniformly tended towards identifying as “natural” or “innate” those behaviors most commonly accepted in their own society. This, for Spencer, the natural human was upper-middle class nineteenth century English (Spencer and MacRae 1969), for Desmond Morris bourgeois twentieth century English (Morris 1967), and for modern evolutionary psychologists, the natural, adaptive human behaviors are WEIRD (western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic). It is very hard not to export one’s own local cultural and social preconceptions into the explananda and explanans alike when dealing with social facts about human beings.
This “pull of the familiar” leads to a tendency to define institutions like “religion” in terms that best apply to modern capitalist industrial urbanized societies and their categories. In short, it leads to classifying religions in terms that centre upon Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, the so-called “world religions” that are supposed to have developed out of the “Axial Age”. (Jaspers 1951) In fact, these are among the least typical religions in human history, and become procrustean beds on which other religions, more widespread and typical, are trimmed or stretched to fit. Any attempt to make other religions or religious behaviors fit the prototype of Christianity (or any “word religion” or Axial Age tradition, possibly) will lead researchers away from the root causes of religious behaviors rather than towards them. For example a recent overview of the evolution of religion by Robert Bellah (Bellah 2011) focuses upon the production of existential meaning, based upon psychoanalytic and existentialist philosophical categories that are themselves heir to the religious tradition they are brought into play to account for.
Therefore we must distinguish between differing aspects of religion such that they can be naturalized. Cognitive, psychological and doctrinal aspects of religion call for one set of explanatory resources. Social, cultural and institutional aspects call for another. The advantage of taking a phylogenetic approach is that it does not presuppose naively the normative status of various kinds of behaviors. What is shared by all apes is shared whether or not those homologies are privileged in a given cultural discourse. We must consider the role of dominance behaviors in religions, but for a phylogenetic approach to work, we have first to ask if behaviors can be taken to be homologous.

Figure 1. “Phylogeny of the Old World monkeys (Cercopithecoidea) and apes (Hominoidea) with specific social system traits marked on the branches of the tree where they are reconstructed to have arisen. Female philopatry and various traits pertaining to social relationships among females are derived characteristics of cercopithecoids that arose once in the cercopithecoid ancestor and were subsequently retained in descendant species.” Figure 2 from (Rendall and Di Fiore 2007). Note that Pongo (orangutans), Gorilla and Pan (chimps) are all in a single clade, which includes humans (not shown).
2.	Dominance and homology-based inferences
Behavior is quite labile, evolutionarily, and so there has been debate over whether it can be treated as a homology (Brigandt and Griffiths 2007; Hall 2012; Love 2007). However, classes of behaviors can easily been seen to be homologous. For example, most passerine birds have courtship displays which, while individually unique, fall into a shared class of behaviors, and moreover, these dances are very similar within groups such as riflebirds or lyrebirds (Andrew 1961). It is hard to reject the idea that these are homologies, with species-relative instantiations. The entire field of ethology is founded upon investigating both the commonalities and unique differences of behaviors in many groups of organisms. In principle, there can be no reason a priori to think that primates, and in particular our group of primates, is exempt from this. In paleontology, the inference of the unpreserved or undiscovered traits of an extinct species by projection from known or extant species closely related is called phylogenetic bracketing (Witmer 1995). Without phylogenetic bracketing, little can be known of unobserved species.
However, it may be that dominance psychology is convergent in the sense that the shared trait is sociality, and dominance is a formal side effect of this. Consider that if two organisms interact, in what I shall call a social transaction, then necessarily one will have greater strength, size, speed, or other competitive traits, than the other. It follows that the aggregate of pairwise social transactions with construct a dominance hierarchy, and so no special biological systems or processes need to be invoked, and hence inferences from one group of species (say, African great apes) to another (Homo sapiens) cannot be phylogenetically bracketed. Against this, we might argue that sociality is a synonym for a suite of general behavioral homologies that include social dominance. Also this would not account for the close similarity between the other Hominoidea and humans not shared so closely with more distally related primates.
Of course, there are differences between hominoid apes and humans in social dominance behavior, as there are between the non-human apes species. Common chimps tend to have a single alpha male, and the hierarchy is always determined by male statuses and females derive their status from their mates. Status is determined by aggressive competition and mating occurs in proportion to achieved male status. Bonobos, on the other hand have a hierarchy driven by female choice. This reflects their degree of sexual dimorphism: chimp males are on average around 125% the weight of females, while bonobo males are only slightly larger if at all than the females. Gorilla males are up to three times the weight of the females. As a result a single alpha male guards a harem of females against “bachelor” males. The hierarchy is both within the family, and between males in a territory. Humans, like bonobos, have very slight dimorphism: males weigh around 108% of female weight on average. The degree of polygyny (number of female mates per successfully mating male) largely correlates with size dimorphism. Social hierarchies vary according to species-typical mating strategy.
In humans, however, things are rather more complex. Typical ape hierarchies are either singular (one hierarchy for all, with progeny of high status individuals placing them at the outset at high status) or are formed out of distinct gender hierarchies. Humans have this aspect of social dominance as well, but they also construct a range of other hierarchies, at least in urbanized sedentary nontraditional societies. There are hierarchies of age cohort, of ethnicity, and of class. Age cohorts form their own hierarchies, with older members tending to dominate the younger. Cohorts appear to be pre-adolescent from the time of initial socialization; adolescent; young adult, and older adult. The cohorts themselves tend to form a hierarchy, with older individuals deferred to by younger, ceteris paribus. Ethnicities are contextual, of course. For example, there was in the nineteenth century a clear hierarchy in British society with southern English at the top, then northern English, Scots, Welsh and Irish, largely reflecting the order of conquest and subjugation. Similar scenarios explain the Indus valley caste (Varna) system. The Dalits, or untouchables, tend on genetic analysis to be the autocthonous or older tribes. The highest caste, the Brahmins, are genetically most closely related to Indo-Iranians who moved into the region around 6000 years ago, possibly as the Harrapan civilization. The lower the caste the older the settlement, in general (Bamshad et al. 2001; Thanseem et al. 2006; Sengupta et al. 2006). Finally, there is in any society a class hierarchy. This has to do with a complex of factors, including inherited wealth and networks, but also to do with social division of labor. Once agriculture made food surpluses available and arable territory a critical resource, a warrior class developed to protect these resources, and it typically tended to be the uppermost class (Rindos 1984).
So any agrarian human being, upon encountering a stranger, must solve a simultaneous equation of some complexity to determine who defers to whom. What is the aggregate of their various statuses, at this time and for this person’s age, relative to each other? This itself takes considerable cognitive ability, both to recognize the variables and to work out the ranking. Moreover, each human individual must attempt to maximize their status given their personal attributes (bigger, fitter individuals do better even in non-physical contexts), parental status, and contextual landscape. We might think of the cultural context setting up a “surface” in a state space the individual has to navigate to an optimal tradeoff point, and the surface is not really all that static.

Figure 2: Each individual must strive to reach the best available status tradeoff point given the cultural context, on a range of variables, including age cohort, ethnicity, class, gender (not shown), and possibly other active hierarchies.
We now turn to how this might explain religious behavior.
3.	The social function of religion
When discussing the function of religion and immediate concern arises about the explananda: what are we explaining under the rubric “religion”? Much literature on the naturalization of religion focuses upon the psychological aspects: existential anxieties, cognitive dispositions, phenomenological aspects such as mystical experiences, and agency detection (Alcorta and Sosis 2005; Atran 2006; Atran and Norenzayan 2005; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007; Barrett 2000, 2007; Bulbulia 2004, 2007; Dennett 2006; Dow 2007; Gregory 2000; Dow 2008; Dow 2006; Bulbulia et al. 2008; Ketelaar 2005; Kirkpatrick 2005; Rue 2000; Norenzayan and Shariff 2008; Reynolds and Tanner 1995; Rossano 2006; Sosis and Alcorta 2005; Sosis and Bressler 2003; Tremlin 2006; Wilkins 2010; Wilson 2002). These explanations cover experienced religion, as it were from the standpoint of the believers. Other explanations, derived from the sociological tradition, discuss the economic or particular historical role religions have played in a given case: why Christianity and Islam became world religions (when Zoroastrianism or Mithraism did not). The social and political explanation of religion has a long history, at least back to Aristotle, who said
Also he [the tyrant] should appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the Gods; for if men think that a ruler is religious and has a reverence for the Gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to have the very Gods fighting on his side. At the same time his religion must not be thought foolish. [Aristotle, Politics Book 5, chapter 11 1314b38–1315a4, Jowett translation.]
Neither of these are the target here, however. What concerns us here is why religion exists at all across all human societies, as a social universal. It may be that it is a necessary outworking of the experienced aspects of religion, but this seems unlikely. Most people who are members of a religious tradition experience few or none of these “transcendent” states. It is not even clear that most religions do, in fact, concern themselves with death and the afterlife all that much. Modern studies do not show that death is all that crucial to religious belief (Leming 1979-80) and in all probability even the Hebrew religious traditions did not teach an afterlife apart from physical existence prior to contact with Greek psychism (Keller 1974). Instead, I wish to propose a biosocial explanation of religion, based around our shared primate social nature.
One of the consistent properties of religions is that they mark the extent of a community. Any Baptist can enter any Baptist church in the world, independent of ethnicity or social class, and find some kind of social support: there is a ready-made community for those who move about. The same is true of Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and many of the smaller and more recent religious traditions such as Mormonism. Depending upon the extant alternatives, finer grain communities may be formed along denominational lines, or extend to all Christians or Muslims against infidels. No matter what the fineness of grain, religious adherence marks the in-group from the out-group. This is an urgent concern when kin-relations are not the basis for community engagement, in a society that is simply too large for traditional society kinship to determine the status of individuals in pairwise social transactions. There is a working memory constraint on who can be tracked once the size of the community reaches a certain size, possibly around “Dunbar’s Number” of around 150 individuals ± 50 (Dunbar 1992; Hill and Dunbar 2003). In high density populations, individual competition ceases to determine most comparative status assignments, and surrogates must be employed instead. Call these surrogates tribal markers – they are signals of community engagement and membership. Tribal markers can include accents​[2]​, dress, beliefs (social or religious), ritual actions, loyalty to sporting teams or political parties.
A tribal marker must have several features. It must be arbitrary. If there were good reasons for adopting it (such as sanitary reasons or technological efficiency) then it would be more widely adopted and would not serve to mark the tribal affiliation uniquely. It must be obvious. Privately held beliefs will not serve to demarcate adherents from non-adherents. There has to be some public practice or action that can be seen. Finally, a tribal marker must be hard to fake. If anyone can easily behave like a Catholic in a Catholic society, then freeloaders will be able to subvert the social capital for their own benefit, without contributing in return. Such easily invaded situations are in disequilibrium and will eventually collapse. So demonstrating one’s allegiances must be costly and hard to fake (Sosis 2004). Religion serves all these purposes (but see Pyysiäinen 2005). The adoption of the basic catechetical knowledge of a religion takes a long time. Ritual behaviors like crossing oneself or knowing when to stand or kneel during a service take years of repetition to make natural and rapid. Tithing or other forms of contributions in kind or in resources are expensive also. Beliefs themselves take years to acquire, along with familiarity of the sacred stories. All these add up to an arbitrary, costly, hard to fake honest signal, that stands as a surrogate for pairwise comparison in a dominance transaction. Costly signals of tribal membership permit two individuals in a society to evaluate each other’s relative status, to know whether one defers to the other or they are roughly equals and able to compete for resources, and whether one will aid the other or the other’s family members if they are in times of trouble or want. Religious affiliation is therefore an outworking of tribal affiliation, or kin-selected altruism, in a socioeconomic situation it did not evolve to deal with: post-agrarian sedentary or partially sedentary societies with high population densities. It is one of several solutions to the problem Who can I trust to help me, and to whom do I owe assistance?
This implies that religion did not exist in societies that were pre-agrarian, which several lines of evidence speak against. First, traditional societies today, and archeological evidence, suggests that gods were worshipped before agrarian high density societies. It is not my claim that supernatural or preternatural agents were not believed in, propitiated or worshipped before agriculture. They clearly were, but this is not, in the sense used here, religion. Consider a parallel claim: there were politics before agriculture. However, in a small group, everyone is engaged in politics, along the lines of Aristotle’s dictum that “man is a political animal”. There were political (and religious) behaviors prior to the agricultural revolution c12,500 years before present, but there were no independent or specialist political or religious institutions then. If everyone is engaged in political and religious behaviors, why isolate these behaviors as distinct social activities? Only because they resemble, in some arbitrary fashion, behaviors today that are labeled as “political” or “religious”. Until there has been a social division of labor, and perhaps caste, we cannot rightly even speak of religion in a society.
A more powerful argument against this view is the discoveries at Göbekli Tepe (Schmidt 2000b, 2000a) and Çatalhöyük (Hodder 2006, 2007), both in Anatolia (now central Turkey) from before or at the beginnings of agriculture. Göbekli Tepe is in particular a problem, as it looks like a major piece of monumental architecture solely for the purpose of religious worship (thus satisfying the division of labor requirement) before there were high density populations nearby (thus undercutting the high density requirement). However several defenses can be raised. First, it is not clear yet that this really was a purely religious locale. That is the interpretation of the archeologists, but the site predates written language by around 6000 years, and so at best we can say that it looks like a religious temple site, based on our (post-agrarian) experience. It may have been a settlement, but the monumental architecture survived where the settlement architecture did not (or has not yet been unearthed). Moreover, agriculture did not come into being suddenly. There is evidence of a long period of domestication (inadvertently at first) of plants and animals in the near east that pre-dates Göbekli Tepe by as much as 2000 years (Heun, Haldorsen, and Vollan 2008). We simply do not know what population size fed into the building of that site. Absence of evidence is not, as they say, evidence of absence. Finally, there may be outlier cases that have special circumstances, although I would not want to appeal too much to that defense.
To summarize, religion here means social institutional religion, and the account given is that it is a solution (not the only one) to the coordination problem of reciprocal altruism in population densities that exceed the individual capacity to track debts and favors. It is a surrogate for this that lessens the cognitive load and establishes in-group and out-group honestly and reliably.
4.	Dominance hierarchies and religion
In any society, priests and religious figures are high status (although in a wider context the high status religious figures of the religious community may be low status in the broad society; a prophet being despised in his or her own land). Explaining sacerdotal status in dominance terms is an obvious move. Being a priest is akin to being an alpha male in an ape troop – female priests are rarer in sedentary societies, although there are obvious parallels, like the Vestal Virgins or the sacred prostitutes of ancient near eastern cults, as well as modern female religious orders in Christian and Buddhist traditions. Status seeking when the religious are able to breed is explicable in ordinary terms: their individual fitness is raised because they have higher quality mates, food, dwelling, etc. When the religious are celibate, a rarer but still common occurrence, however, this needs explanation. There are two ways to do so: one is that they are maximizing their inclusive fitness. The families of those who have priests are often accorded higher status, which allows nephews and nieces to improve their lot. Also, celibacy is often not practiced as completely as it is said to be, as the Borgia popes and numerous cases of Catholic priests fathering children since celibacy was introduced in the fourth century CE demonstrates. The other solution is that the status-seeking behavior of humans is employed in situation outside those conditions for which it evolved, and thus is a spandrel.​[3]​ Either way, the religious are held in high regard. The question is not why priests and nuns would seek to increase their status that way, but why they are held in high regard by the wider society. What benefit, if any, is it for the rest of the community that priests and nuns hold that rank?
It is not necessary that there actually be a benefit to others, so long as there is a benefit to high status individuals. Consider a hypothetical case: the first monarch of the first urban society. That society is an amalgam of tradition village-level settlements each with its own head man or woman, grouped together under competition-hardened lieutenants of the monarch. The increase in population density has led to a social division of labor so that there is a warrior class – after the domestication of horses, mostly an equestrian class (Rindos 1984). The king, who is the alpha of the society (I presume this holds for female dominant societies, but the difference in sexual dimorphism in humans suggests it was more likely a king) outcompeted, by both threat but also alliance building, these lieutenants. A second power base through a sacerdotal class or lineage of authority will tend to undercut the threat from that class. Religion is, as Aristotle, Machiavelli and many others including Cicero knew, a powerful tool for ensuring that the political order is maintained.
5.	Gods above
Kings are mystical beings in most traditional societies. Until quite recently, in the 18th century CE, it was held even in rationalist England that the king’s touch could cure scrofula (a skin disease probably a mixture of acne, seborrheic dermatitis, and various other conditions). In east African societies before European settlement, ordinary folk were not permitted to even have the king’s shadow touch them, on pain of death. Kings are Powers. A decade or so ago an Australian Prime Minister touched the back of the Queen when introducing her to dignitaries during a visit, in a kind fashion one might use for a revered grandmother. The British tabloids went crazy, calling him the “lizard of Oz” and accusing him of gross disrespect. Even now we revere monarchs beyond reason.
The behavior towards a monarch is very like the behavior towards a deity or representation of a deity, and it is the classic primate response towards a higher status, powerful, individual. Lower yourself. You must not be taller than the high status individual as that is a challenge to their status. Do not stare at them, lower your eyes. A stare is a threat and a challenge (it is even called the primate threat stare). Do not seek to acquire resources in their presence, particularly food. The higher status individual has the first pick of the food and resources, and gets to portion them out. The dominant individual rewards their subordinate allies and punishes their subordinate defectors. We bow to monarchs (absolute monarchs get full body prostration) and make ourselves defenseless, so that we present no challenge to be dealt with. They eat first, and share rewards to their favorites. We give them resources to demonstrate our loyalty. We entreat them for favors and thus bind ourselves to them. All this is typical ape behavior. Notice that we invest in monarchs what Justin Barrett (Barrett 2005; Barrett and Keil 1996) has called “minimal counterituitive agency” or MCI: monarchs are like us, and so comprehensible in their motivations and desires, but they have special powers and sacred properties.
Now notice that, in addition to treating monarchs and higher status individuals in general, the same way that an ape would, we also behave exactly like this to gods. Priests and kings alike prostrate themselves to their gods. They give sacrifices (resource sharing) and wait for the gods to authorize their own consumption. They do not assume a “proud” posture before the gods, but avoid staring. In some cases only the highest priests, acting as the betas, or seconds (or “vicar”, one who stands in the place of another, like the Pope) of the gods, may look upon them. Post-Exilic Jews had a location in the Temple, the Holy of Holies where the Shekinah, or Presence, of God was said by the Talmud to reside, and only the High Priests could enter it, for example.
Return to the hypothetical first urban society for a minute. The structure of the kingdom at the time of stability is this:

Figure 3. A schematic of a hypothetical early urbanized society.
Now suppose the old king is about to die. His lieutenants are battle-hardened and politically savvy or they would not be lieutenants. The king’s son or other chosen heir, however, is not as hardened. The heir may be able to defend and rise in their status, but the chances are that the heir will not be as capable in competition as the lieutenants. So the dying king has a problem: how to ensure that the heir will be treated the way the present king is when he is dead? There is an obvious answer: do not die. Monarchs often become the focus of post-mortem cults. The Roman emperor, Vespasian, wittily remarked as he lay dying, “Oh, I am becoming a god!” The Imperial cults of Rome were unremarkable, anthropologically. It looks like the role that a god plays is very like a king’s, in the sense that the god rewards allies (adherents, devotees) and punishes defectors (infidels, apostates), and raises those who are pre-eminent allies to higher status. So it pays to have deputies to ensure that the political competitors for the now vacated office are reminded of the dead king’s orders. We can expect then, that we will get something like this, either through deliberate planning by a foresighted king, or by social evolution:

Figure 4: A dead king becomes a god, and has new deputies.
I am not suggesting that all deities begin as historical figures, a view known as Euhemerism, after the 4th century BCE Greek author Euhemerus (Brown 1946); many may have, but they are equally likely to include any number of types of cultural heroes or high status individuals.​[4]​ Deities in a more general sense, as figures of natural power like the Italic Numina, or the Kami of Shinto, preceded these religious institutions, and are very likely the result of what has been misnamed the Hyperactive Agency Detection Module, or HADD (Atran and Norenzayan 2005; Sperber 2004). That there is a tendency to find agency, or purposive behavior, in nature is not controversial, even if no module exists as such. These can be personal or impersonal powers, but their crucial aspect is that they require no worship, propitiation or allegiance. They may evolve into fully blown deities, but I suspect without evidence that most deities begin as generalized ancestors, whose status is acquired by their death, and persists. I call this hypothesis Dominance Euhemerism.
The view that some deities began as historical figures is also uncontroversial. Maria Lionza in Peru is a case in point. She is one of a triumvirate of gods who were almost certainly indigenous resistance fighters against the Spanish invasion. More recently figures like Elvis Presley have become the focus of veneration. Deities are constantly in the process of being born. This is comprehensible if we see them as projected high status individuals behaving the way apes do, and insisting upon us behaving like apes also. Better, since we construct these alpha individuals ourselves, gods are the outworking of ape social dominance behavior in conditions of high density populations and abstract communication. Or, give chimps agriculture and symbolic language, and they’d have religion in short order.
Treating religion as a way of enforcing social status relations explains another aspect of religious institutions: their function to enforce social norms. It is well understood that when primed to think in terms of deities watching them, humans will tend to be more eusocial, that is, to be more honest and rule-following (Shariff and Norenzayan 2007). Since this is exactly what high status individuals do in ape societies, we should expect that religious institutions piggyback on this primate disposition. Gods are moral enforcers, through both their cognitive influence and their deputies and vicars. Finally, since we know that social dominance evolved in response to the dual conditions of limited resources and mating opportunities, it is entirely clear why religious institutions concern themselves with sexual morés and who may mate with whom. Social dominance is all about sex and mating, and so any more complex behavior that is built upon it will also tend to focus in upon sex and mating, either directly or indirectly through the socioeconomic structures that it constructs.
6.	Conclusion
We began by identifying three types of natural explanations of religion: individual, socioeconomic and biosocial. The dominance hypothesis complements and to a degree explains, but does not supplant individual hypotheses like HAD (dropping the modular “device”) and MCI. It explains why some socioeconomic outcomes, like the norm enforcement role religion plays, are likely. It does not explain, but is consonant with socioeconomic explanations like the Weberian account of protestantism supporting capitalist economic behaviors at a time that capitalism became a social necessity. These are particularistic hypotheses in history against a background of a general notion of human behaviors.
There is a possible account of the origins of deities that might be filled out to some extent when evidence is available. It is unlikely that Zeus (to use Euhemerus’ own example) was a historical king, or that El was the father of a fractious west Semitic royal family, but it is not unlikely that there is a historical chain of connections between them and one or more actual dead leaders and heroes. It is not insignificant that most early religious cults were tribally based (“Thou shalt have no gods before Me” presumes the existence of at least the cults of other tribal gods, if not the gods themselves). Henotheism is probably the default state of religious institutions.
We might ask what this means for the presumed truth of modern religions. In what has been called an evolutionary debunking argument (Griffiths and Wilkins In Press) the notion of a “Milvian Bridge” argument (the success of Constantine at the battle of the Milvian Bridge was traditionally explained in terms of the truth of Christianity) has been introduced. Griffiths and I argued that there is no adaptive correlation between the success of this or that modern religion, and its truth, but neither does giving a natural account necessary disprove it. At worst, naturalizing religion leads to a loss of confidence in the uniqueness and likelihood of the truth of its teachings.
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^1	  Affiliate, Philosophy, University of Sydney; email: john@wilkins.id.au. Also employed at the University of Melbourne.
^2	  For example in the book of Judges 2:5-7, the Gileadites slay the Ephraimites, who are ethnically otherwise indistinguishable from them, based on whether they could pronounce the word “shibboleth” correctly; ever since some tribal markers are called shibboleths. The particular term used here is arbitrary, and meant the seed-bearing part of a plant. It only had to be hard to fake, and accents are among the hardest.
^3	  A spandrel is a trait that is a side effect of the function for which it evolved (Gould and Lewontin 1979). Whether we can ever know clearly what an evolved function evolved for is a moot point (Forber 2009).
^4	  Attempts to give historical accounts of gods include Snorri Sturluson’s Prose Edda of the 13th century CE, and Robert Graves’ White Goddess Graves 1948 and The Greek Myths 1955. They have not generally been successful, understandably since the evidence of the transformation from real person to deity is rarely preserved.
